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LIFE AFTER DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW:
MAINE AS A CASE LAW LABORATORY
FOR EVIDENCE RULE 702
WITHOUT FRYE
I. TIE POINT IN CONFLICT:
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
In reaching its recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court grappled
not with case law but with fundamental questions about the nature
of science and its role in law. The court in Daubert addressed the
problematic issue of admissibility of expert scientific testimony. In
the end the Court rejected as an exclusionary rule the venerable
standard set in 1923 by Frye v. United States.2 Frye held that sci-
entific testimony was to be excluded unless it had gained "general
acceptance" in its field.3 Daubert held that Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence displaced the Frye rule. It remains to be seen how
admissibility of scientific testimony will play out in the federal
courts now that Daubert has altered the Frye rule.
Daubert sent shock waves of uncertainty through the litigation
bar.4 "The catch," warned Supreme Court watcher David 0. Stew-
art, "is that no one is exactly sure what the new standard is."" Ad-
missibility of scientific testimony can be a critical factor in a broad
range of litigation, and Daubert's uncertain prognosis cuts a wide
swath.
Science holds understandable allure for a party caught up in dis-
pute within the American trial system. A trial is a battle over what
constitutes historical truth. A party tries to convince the factfinder
that her version of what happened is what happened. To the extent
that scientific evidence presents convincing corroboration of one
party's version of truth, it can decide the case.0 Little wonder that
scientific evidence is offered eagerly by litigators who manage to find
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. Id. at 1014.
4. See, e.g., Andre V. Tolpegin, A Critical Analysis of Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 1993, at 14. See also Tom Milch, From the War Zone,
SoNREEL NEWS, (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Resources, Energy & EnvtL L.) Sept.-Oct. 1993, at
2; A New "Standard" for Scientific Evidence-Every Judge a Scientist, MTC
NOTES, PUBLICATION MED. & Tkcn. CONSULTANTS, Jan. 1994, at 1.
5. David 0. Stewart, Decision Creates Uncertain Future for Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony, ABA J., Nov. 1993, at 48.
6. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. Rxv. 40, 52 (1901) ("Now the important thing and the only
important thing to notice is that the expert has taken the jury's place if they believe
him.").
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a source of data and analysis favorable to their client's version of the
truth.7 Practitioners who would oppose the introduction of scientific
testimony by an adversary at trial, however, no longer can rely on
the simplistic, if unpredictable, "general acceptance" exclusionary
standard of Frye. Now they must contend with Daubert. Persuasive
admissibility and exclusion arguments will turn not on what
Daubert says but on what Daubert means.
This Comment explores two sources of insight that may help prac-
titioners come to terms with what Daubert means. First, it evaluates
the role of reliability and relevance in admissibility of scientific tes-
timony. Then it examines instructive Maine state decisions handed
down since 1978 without Frye as an exclusionary rule. That dual
exploration is presented in five parts. Following the Introduction,
Part II presents a discussion of the use of science in the courtroom
and the Frye rule as the measure of admissibility of scientific evi-
dence. Part III describes the Bendectin cases leading up to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. Part IV com-
pares the 1993 decision in Daubert with the 1978 decision of the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court," in State v.
Williams,9 which anticipated by fifteen years the United States Su-
preme Court's rejection of Frye as a tool for excluding scientific tes-
timony. Part V considers the substitution by Daubert and Williams
of "reliability" as the test for admissibility of scientific evidence in
place of Frye's "general acceptance" standard. For insight into the
application of Rule 702 without Frye, Part VI discusses selected sci-
entific evidence decisions made by the Law Court since State v.
Williams.
7. E.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (1980) ('[T]he
use of scientific knowledge to solve legal problems has long been recognized, and it is
not surprising that a society so dependent on science and technology should turn to
such knowledge as a method of proof.") (footnote omitted).
8. "[W]e should point out to beginning lawyers that the term 'Law Court' is pecu-
liar to Maine. It derives from an old statute, now 4 M.R.S.A. § 57, which gives the
Supreme Judicial Court jurisdiction to sit en banc 'as a court of law.' It has tradition-
ally been used to distinguish the appellate function of the full Court from the nisi
prius functions of single justices. Those unfamiliar with this tradition should not
think that the word 'Law' is used in contradistinction to 'Equity."' FIELD & MURRAY,
MAINE EVIDENcE at xiii (1976).
9. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
[Vol. 46:285
LIFE AFTER DAUBERT
I. SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM AND FRYE AS THE MEASURE OF
ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
A. Science in the Courtroom
The power of scientific evidence flows from a fundamental charac-
teristic science shares with trial: both are mechanisms employed to
seek truth.0 However, science is not itself truth. Science is the ac-
cumulation of past experiences of those seeking truth.
In broadest terms, scientists seek a systematic organization of
knowledge about the universe and its parts. This knowledge is
based on explanatory principles whose verifiable consequences can
be tested by independent observers. Science encompasses a large
body of evidence collected by repeated observations and experi-
ments. Although its goal is to approach true explanations as closely
as possible, its investigators claim no final or permanent explana-
tory truths. Science changes. It evolves.11
The accumulated history of observing, guessing, testing, measur-
ing, and drawing conclusions therefrom occupies a full shelf in
human endeavor. A party trying to establish at law where truth lies
often looks to this prior experience, i.e., to science, for help. When
he finds there some parcel of the record of human inquiry support-
ing a conclusion he wishes to have drawn in his own case, he offers it
in support of his argument.
A party offers scientific evidence to show that someone else, look-
ing at circumstances akin to his, has observed a consequence like the
one he wishes the factfinder to believe. Science in the courtroom
does not offer truth. It offers parallel, and therefore corroborating,
circumstantial evidence.
Scientific testimony can play a critical role in both criminal and
civil cases. Expert explanation of blood spatter tests can convince a
jury that the state's contention that a mortal wound was inflicted
inside a particular vehicle is more likely to be the truth than a con-
tradictory explanation offered by a man on trial for murder.1 2 Ex-
pert testimony can give a jury the news that others before them
have observed, in systematic analysis, that it is possible for the cal-
culated murder of a husband by an abused wife to be self defense.
13
Measurements and test analyses explained by an expert from a na-
10. D.H. Kaye, Proof in Law and Science, 32 JURmiTmCS J. 313, 315 (1992). See
also THOhi~s S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTIFic REVOLUTIONS 23 (1970).
11. Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102) (citing NATIONAL ACADy oF ScmNCES,
SCIENCE AND CREAnoMsm- A VEw FROM THE NATIONAL AcADEMY oF ScENcas 8
(1984)).
12. See Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, sub nom.
Grossman v. Florida, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
13. See State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
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tional consumer institution can let a factfinder know that engineers
have concluded that a car's structural seat design inadequately pro-
tected against the secondary risks of impact.14 University research-
ers can describe for a jury how they reviewed medical studies of
women who took a particular drug during pregnancy and observed
in the data that women who took the drug bore children with birth
defects statistically more frequently than those who did not take the
drug.15
Scientific testimony has the power to settle in a factfinder's mind
where truth more likely lies in the case at hand. If science were
truth, no harm would be done by such juror acquiescence. Science,
however, is not truth, but a collection of tested hypotheses and ob-
servations based on those tests.1 The conclusions of science are al-
ways open to further testing and therefore always open to
refinement.17
B. The Need to Define an Evidentiary Standard
for Scientific Evidence
The integrity of the trial process, sensitive to "false" evidence of
any kind, is perceived as particularly vulnerable to misuse of scien-
tific conclusions offered through expert testimony.18 On the one
hand, shallowly drawn or uncertain conclusions admitted as evi-
dence may be adopted as truth by jurors. Judges express concern
that, in the face of testimony of someone with apparent training and
expertise, who already has made her own observations on a critical
issue now facing them, jurors may adopt the scientific conclusion as
truth. Judges fear jurors may let the testimony subsume their own
truth-finding responsibility or may overestimate the evidence's de-
14. See Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976).
15. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
16. The theory of knowledge whose task is the analysis of the method or
procedure peculiar to empirical science, may accordingly be described as a
theory of the empirical method-a theory of what is usually called
experience.
... Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable....
But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is
capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that
not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a
criterion of demarcation [between scientific and metaphysical systems].
Si KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DiscovERY 39-40 (1965).
17. See KUHN, supra note 10, at 82-84.
18. See State v. Spencer, 216 N.W.2d 131, 134 (Minn. 1974) ("We are concerned,
however, about the sweeping and unqualified manner in which [the expert's] testi-
mony was offered. Where expert testimony concerning a new scientific technique is





On the other hand, the integrity of the trial process also is at risk
where, in the name of protecting jurors from the influence of "junk"
science, thoughtfully drawn scientific conclusions, based on good
data, careful observation, and tested theory, are kept out of evidence
on the ground that they never have been published in a scientific
journal.20 Overzealous screening of scientific evidence can deny the
factfinder access to the worthy experience of others who previously
have addressed with care a complicated question the factfinder now
must decide.21 Either way, with sound science kept out or invalid
science let in, the truth-determining process of trial is diminished.
Advocates are keenly aware of the impact of admissibility of sci-
entific testimony. Those with a client whose version of the truth will
be undermined by contrary conclusions of identified experts throw
up blockades to keep those scientific conclusions out of evidence and
19. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (observing
that there is a danger that scientific evidence will be viewed by laymen as having
"mystic infallibility"). See also United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir.
1977) (noting that confusion of the jury is an issue of concern with scientific evi-
dence); Marshall v. Sellers, 53 A.2d 5, 10 (Md. 1947) (noting that because a jury must
be capable of deciding how much weight to give evidence, the possibility that a jury
may not be able to understand and assess foundations of expert scientific testimony
is significant).
20. Publication and peer review are mechanisms by which the scientific commu-
nity attempts to validate work in the ongoing process that is science. See infra note
28 for discussion of scientific validity. Scientists rely on the course of public an-
nouncement (typically in a professional journal), followed by opportunity for open
criticism from others in the field, as a way to weigh the observations of scientific
research and subject its conclusions to the continued refinement and corroboration of
the scientific process. See Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56
FoRDHAh L REv. 595, 622-25 (1988). Publication of scientific observations and con-
clusions invites both challenges and attempts to replicate results.
The functional mechanism of science in which publication and peer review play a
role parallels the mechanism that tests judicial opinions in the arena of legal criti-
cism. See KUHN, supra note 10, at 23 (a scientific paradigm "like an accepted judicial
decision in the common law... is an object for further articulation and specification
under new or more stringent conditions."). Science seeks truth without respite. The
law seeks justice without respite. Neither attains with finality its grail Along the way,
however, in both science and law, some conclusions inspire our confidence more than
others. See Francisco J. Ayala & Bert Black, Scientific Criteria for Scientific Claims,
in JUDICIAL CONTROL OF Scmasrrnic EVIDENc& THE IMPLICAT7ONS OF DAMBERT 29-30
(A.B.A. Section of Business Law, 1993 Annual Meeting, New York, New York). These
scientific conclusions, published or not, that inspire confidence are those arrived at
via methods of principle and capable of withstanding the validation testing of the
discipline. POPPER, supra note 16, at 251 n.1 (Corroboration is the degree to which an
hypothesis has stood up to severe tests, and thus "proved its mettle.").
21. One case in which judicial caution kept out of evidence testimony on scientific
technology accepted outside the courtroom is Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1946). Testimony concerning paternity blood testing was excluded. On
the basis of the mother's testimony, Charlie Chaplin was required to pay child sup-
port for a child that blood testing had demonstrated could not be his.
1994]
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away from the jury's consideration. Those who have located a scien-
tific observation aligned with the conclusion they wish to have
drawn in their client's case argue that an expert ought to be allowed
to share such evidence with the jury, even though the research
methodology may be new or applied in only a single study.
Courts often must -make legal decisions without the luxury of
waiting for the results of thoughtful, well tested, thoroughly repli-
cated scientific research.2 They often have to decide the admissibil-
ity of scientific conclusions that have yet to be vetted by years of
research. Both the Federal and Maine Rules of Evidence make it the
unenviable task of the judge to decide when expert scientific testi-
mony will be admitted in evidence and when it must be kept out.23
Courts understand the problems associated with both inappropri-
22. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Courts cannot, unfortunately, wait indefinitely until all scientists have com-
pleted their long term studies. They must decide on information now available."),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
23. FED. R. EVID. 104 provides in relevant part:
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
(e) Weight and Credibility.
This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
M. R. EviD. 104 provides in relevant part:
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a wit-
ness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In
making this determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privileges and on questions arising in hearings on mo-
tions to suppress evidence and the like.
(b) Relevancy Conditioned on Fact.
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition
of fact, the court shall admit it upon the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the condition has been fulfilled. The court has
discretion to admit evidence conditionally upon the representation that its
relevancy will be established by evidence subsequently offered.
(e) Weight and Credibility.
This rule does not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury
evidence relevant to weight or credibility.
[Vol. 46:285
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ately received and inappropriately excluded scientific evidence .2
Science is a dynamic body of observations-to-date, of working as-
sumptions, of contingent and sometimes competing conclusions vul-
nerable to future invalidation or refinement. Given that science is
not a set of "true facts" from which parties may draw to support
their arguments but rather the record of an evolutionary process
seeking truth, how is a judge to decide the evidentiary sufficiency of
particular scientific testimony? When should expert scientific testi-
mony come in? When should it be kept out? Courts have struggled
to find an answer.25
The court's struggle with scientific evidence is not to know truth
in order that it may be admitted as evidence.20 Judges want to ad-
mit scientific evidence when it advances the search for truth in the
trial process. They want to deny parties the use of scientific evi-
dence when its observations and conclusions are the result of re-
search so uncertainly performed that it threatens the search for
truth. Courts must decide where to draw the line between truth-
advancing and truth-threatening scientific research.2 7 The reliability
of scientific evidence's is a question of process, not of conclusion.
24. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 951-52 (3d
Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
25. Frederick B. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Juumm-cs J 254, 256 n.4 (1984).
26. A conscientious scientist will weigh the available data and reach an as-
sessment of its strength, but science cannot tell the scientists at what point
the data are strong enough to warrant an award of compensation. One may
or may not agree with the legal concepts and may propose alternatives, but
one cannot look to science for an absolute decisionmaking standard because
none exists.
Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at n.30, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102) (quoting Institute for Health Policy
Analysis of Georgetown Medical Center, Conference on Causation and Financial
Compensation 18 (1986)).
27. For a focused collection of cases illustrating the courts' search for principles
upon which to ground admissibility of scientific testimony see the "Bendectin cases,"
infra, at notes 42 and 56.
28. Legal decisions may use the terms "validity" and "reliability" interchangeably
and may not distinguish scientific reliability from evidentiary reliability. In science,
validity means accuracy, the ability of a scientific test to measure what it says it
measures. Scientific reliability is a measure of whether the test produces consistent
results each time it is performed. A test that is scientifically valid is also scientifically
reliable, but a test that is scientifically reliable is not necessarily valid. See PAUL C.
GrAELLi & EDWARD J. IwINKELRmD, Scimmuic EvmENcE § 1-1 n.1 (2d ed. 1993).
Evidentiary reliability is a measure of a court's confidence that proffered evidence
has adequate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. '"The objective of screen-
ing scientific data to be used in litigation is to ensure that it is reliable or trustwor-
thy." B.J. George, Jr., Statistical Problems Relating to Scientific Evidence, in ScmN-
Tnic AND ExPEr EVIDENCE 105, 118 (Edward J. Imwinkelried ed., 2d ed. 1981).
Practitioners are familiar with the concept of evidentiary reliability in exceptions to
the hearsay exclusion. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). A court can have no eviden-
1994]
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But if scientific evidence admissibility turns on "reliability," how is
a court to decide what constitutes "reliable" scientific evidence?
What is the evidentiary standard to be?
C. The Rise and Fall of Frye v. United States
In 1923 apparent salvation hove into sight for judges beleaguered
with the job of deciding the admissibility of complicated, controver-
sial, and conflicting scientific testimony. Salvation took the form of
a phrase in a terse two-page opinion in a case decided by the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia. The case was Frye v. United
States.29 The science at issue was lie detection. The key phrase was
"general acceptance." The court wrote: "[W]hile courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the de-
duction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."30
Here was judicial relief. The test for admitting scientific evidence
would be "general acceptance," which seemed easy enough to apply.
The seed of "general acceptance" as the test for scientific evidence
reliability, and hence for relevance and admissibility, fell on welcom-
ing ground. In the words of one Maine commentator, the Frye rule
"spread like crabgrass.""1
Federal and state courts across the country, including Maine, em-
braced the D.C. District Court's Frye test.3 2 At its half century mark
the Frye test dominated decisions on admissibility of scientific evi-
dence,3" but change was in the wind.3'
tiary confidence in a scientific test, even though it produces the same result each
time, if that test does not measure what it purports to measure. Scientific reliability
by itself does not confer evidentiary reliability. Scientific validity does confer eviden-
tiary reliability. In order to avoid confusing scientific and evidentiary reliability, this
Comment will use "reliability" only in the sense of evidentiary reliability.
29. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that the favorable results of a sys-
tolic blood pressure test purportedly able to detect falsehoods offered by the defend.
ant as proof of his veracity were inadmissible because the test had not yet gained
enough standing and recognition among physiological and psychological authorities to
justify the court's admitting its results in evidence).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. Author's discussion with Michael W. Mullane, Professor of Evidence, Univer-
sity of Maine School of Law.
32. See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) ("This criterion of 'general
acceptance' in the scientific community has come to be the standard in almost all of
the courts in the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of
scientific evidence."). Maine first adopted the "general acceptance" test in State v.
Casale, 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (Me. 1954) (quoting Boeche v. State, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597
(Neb. 1949) (holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible because it had "not
yet received general scientific acceptance")).
33. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1205.
34. Id. at 1207-08 ("[T]he problems Frye has engendered-the difficulties in ap-
plying the test and the anomalous results it creates-so far outweigh [its] advantages
[Vol. 46:285
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During the 1970s a chorus of criticism of Frye gained steam35 The
principal criticisms were that the "general acceptance" standard was
keeping valid science out of evidence and that "general acceptance"
was often difficult to determine. Amid this rising debate, Congress
in 1975 enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence." Maine quickly fol-
lowed suit; the Maine Supreme Judicial Court promulgated the
Maine Rules of Evidence to be effective on February 2, 1976.-1
Maine's Rules of Evidence closely track the federal rules. Maine and
Federal Rules of Evidence 7028 and 703,31 governing admission of
expert testimony, are essentially identical. Neither rule sets an ex-
press "general acceptance" threshold for admissibility of scientific
evidence. Both sets of rules are silent as to whether they specifically
supersede Frye's general acceptance test.'0
In Maine it did not take long for a case to arise testing the viabil-
ity of Frye under the new Rules of Evidence. In 1978 the Law Court
held in State v. Williams:
On the approach we adopt the presiding Justice will be allowed a
latitude, which the Frye rule denies, to hold admissible in a partic-
ular case proffered evidence involving newly ascertained, or ap-
plied, scientific principles which have not yet achieved general ac-
ceptance in whatever might be thought to be the applicable
scientific community, if a showing has been made which satisfies
the Justice that the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable to be
held relevant. 41
that the aigument for adopting a different test has become overwhelming.").
35. See id. at 1206. For typical criticism see 22 C. WRIGHT & IK GRAmu, FEDERAsL
PRACTIE AND PROCEDURE § 5168 (1978) and C. McCoRAuCK, EvmE cE § 203 (2d ed.
1972).
36. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 to be effective July 1,
1975 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. (1976)).
37. The Maine Legislature in 1973 passed an enabling act, effective in 1974, au-
thorizing the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to prescribe rules of evidence. (ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-A (West 1989 & Supp. 1993), added by P.L. 1973, ch. 675). The
Maine Rules of Evidence as promulgated by the Law Court became effective Febru-
ary 2, 1976. FMLD & MURRAY, MAN EvWDFNCE at xxiii (1991).
38. FED. R. OF Evm. 702. Testimony by Experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
39. FED. R. Evm. 703. Basis of Opinion Testimony by Experts.
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the ex-
pert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject,
the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
40. See GINLiEL, supra note 7, at 1229.
41. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978). For a full discussion of Wil-
liars see Part IV of this Comment.
1994]
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After Williams, scientific evidence that "will assist the trier of
fact" would include profferings of something that had achieved less
than "general acceptance," as long as such scientific testimony was
"reliable." At the federal level fifteen more years passed before a
decision declared Rule 702 free of the Frye test. The issue was
brought to a head by a division in the federal circuit courts of ap-
peal in what came to be known as the Bendectin cases.2 The decid-




In its 1993 decision in Daubert, the United States Supreme Court,
like Maine's Law Court before it, rejected Frye's "general accept-
ance" rule as a test for excluding expert scientific testimony. "That
austere standard," wrote Justice Blackmun for the unanimous court,
"absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
should not be applied in federal trials.""
III. THE BENDECTIN CASES CARRY DAUBERT V. MERRELL Dow
TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Courts in 49 states and the District of Columbia had faced the
scientific evidence issues raised by the Bendectin cases.4" Bendectin
was a prescription anti-nausea drug" marketed by Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals. 47 Although the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) approved Bendectin in 1956, in the 1970s public concern
arose about the drug's possible relationship to birth defects suffered
by the children of mothers who had taken it to combat the nausea of
pregnancy. 4" In 1980 the FDA's Advisory Committee on Fertility
and Maternal Health reviewed Bendectin safety studies and pro-
nounced that the data did not indicate an increased risk of birth
defects associated with the drug's use.49
Despite the FDA's assurances, however, plaintiffs filed thousands
of "toxic tort" cases against Merrell Dow alleging that Bendectin
was the cause of their children's birth defects.50 Results of the cases
42. Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); DeLuca v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin"
Products Liability Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
43. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
44. Id. at 2794.
45. See Black, supra note 20, at 679.
46. As originally designed, Bendectin was a combination of three components: an
antispasmodic, dicyclomine hydrochloride; an antihistamine, doxylamine succinate;
and Vitamin B6, pyridoxine. Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d at 1191.
47. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2791.





were mixed. Several large plaintiff's verdicts, however, coupled with
decreased use of the drug because of the controversy surrounding it,
caused Merrell Dow to stop producing Bendectin 1
Before Merrell Dow stopped production of Bendectin, two Califor-
nia women, Joyce Daubert and Anita de Young, took it during preg-
nancy. Each subsequently bore a son with limb reduction birth de-
fects. As guardians ad litem on behalf of their infant children,
parents William and Joyce Daubert and Michael Schuller and Anita
de Young sued Bendectin manufacturer Merrell Dow in United
States District Court for the Southern District of California for
damages for the children's injuries. The district court consolidated
these cases as Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5 2
A. The Daubert Trial Court Decision
After extensive discovery, defendant Merrell Dow moved for sum-
mary judgment on grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain
their burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to
causation." At the motion hearing in October, 1989, plaintiffs of-
fered testimony and affidavits from eight experts" who wished to
present their conclusion, based on in vitro studies, chemical struc-
ture analysis, animal studies, and re-analysis of previously published
data, that there existed a significant relation between Bendectin and
birth defects.5 This was not enough for the court, which granted
Merrell Dow's motion for summary judgment. Unfortunately, the
court's rationale for granting summary judgment is not clear.
Citing Bendectin decisions from the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal,50 the court refused to
51. Id.
52. 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Dr. Adrian Gross, licensed and accredited veterinarian with experience in pa-
thology and toxicology;, Dr. Stuart Newman, specialist in developmental biology; Dr.
Alan Done, medical doctor with specialties in pediatrics, clinical pharmacology, and
toxicology;, Dr. Shanna Swan, epidemiologist and biostatistician practicing in the field
of reproductive epidemiology; Dr. Jay Glasser, specialist in biostatistics, epidemiol-
ogy, and biometry; Dr. Wayne Snodgrass, associate professor of pediatrics and phar-
macology and toxicology;, Dr. Johannes Thiersch, specialist in pathology and pharma-
cology;, Dr. John Palmer, professor of pharmacology. Id. at 574-75.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572-75 (citing respectively Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d
1190 (1st Cir. 1987) (expert testimony that Bendectin caused birth defects, when
based on animal and chemical tests and reanalysis of epidemiological studies, was
inadmissible under FED. R Evm. 703); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's prof-
fered testimony was insufficient to support the jury's verdict); In re Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio
1985), aff'd, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, - U.S. _ 109 S. Ct. 788
(1989), (common jury trial held for 1500 Bendectin cases in the Southern District of
Ohio pursuant to an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation); Richard-
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admit any testimony not based on published epidemiological stud-
ies.57 "The federal courts have held that epidemiological studies are
the most reliable evidence of causation in this area. Accordingly, ex-
pert opinion that is not based on epidemiological evidence is not
admissible to establish causation because it lacks the sufficient foun-
dation necessary, under FRE 703."58
In addition, in a confusing final paragraph, the court declared in-
sufficient the plaintiffs' proffered "re-analysis" testimony, which was
based on data from earlier published epidemiological studies but
which arrived at conclusions different from those of the published
studies' authors.59 In finding the plaintiffs' re-analysis wanting, the
Daubert trial court relied on the fact that the recalculation done by
the plaintiffs' expert witnesses was never published or subjected to
peer review and did not state an explicit statistical confidence
level.6 0 On this basis the trial court ruled that these epidemiology
experts' opinion, that re-analysis showed a "statistically significant"
association between Bendectin and birth defects, was insufficient to
take the matter to a jury.61
The scientific testing method known as epidemiology was an im-
portant focus of the Bendectin cases. Epidemiology is the study of
the incidence of disease in a population.6 2 An epidemiological study
examines the relationship between exposure to particular factors
and the occurrence of death or injury in a particular population,
compared to normal background levels. 63
son v. Richardson-Merrell, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (expert testimony that
Bendectin caused birth defects, when based on animal and chemical tests and reanal-
ysis of epidemiological studies, was inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 703)).
57. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. at 572 ("A neces-
sary predicate to the admission of scientific evidence is that the principle upon which
it is based 'must be sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to
which it belongs.'" (quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir.
1978)) (additional citations omitted).
58. Id. at 575.
59. Reflecting years of doctrinal confusion about scientific evidence, neither
of the lower court decisions in Daubert is a model of clarity. Though the
trial court based its holding on evidentiary rules and cases related to admis-
sibility, its language seems more keyed to the issue of sufficiency. The last
paragraph of its decision addresses the legal insufficiency of the inferences
one might draw from the plaintiffs' evidence, which hardly would matter if
the evidence were inadmissible.
Bert Black & John Andrew Singer, The Daubert Debate: 25 Briefs from 108 Parties,
in JUDICIAL CONTROL OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DAUBERT, supra
note 20, at 8 (footnote omitted).
60. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. at 575.
61. Id. at 576.
62. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 945 (3d Cir.
1990) (citing Black & Lillenfield, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 755 (1984)).
63. See Khristine L. Hall & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A
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Epidemiological studies cannot supply direct evidence of causa-
tion; they can, however, provide circumstantial evidence of cause
and effect.6 Epidemiology can strengthen an inference that Bendec-
tin is an agent that causes birth defects, i.e., that Bendectin is a
"teratogen."6 5
When Merrell Dow moved at the Daubert trial court hearing for
summary judgment, it proffered among other evidence in support of
its motion the affidavit of an epidemiologist who had reviewed thirty
published epidemiology studies involving more than 130,000 pa-
tients. Merrell Dow's epidemiologist concluded that no single pub-
lished epidemiological study demonstrated a statistically significant
association between Bendectin and birth defects. The plaintiffs did
not challenge this summary of published studies but asked to be
able to introduce their own experts' contravening testimony.cO
The trial court ruling that only published epidemiological evi-
dence could be admitted, however, denied the plaintiffs the opportu-
nity to present their evidence from in vitro studies, chemical struc-
ture analysis, and animal studies. Their proffered re-analysis, which
was based on previously published epidemiological data, was ruled
insufficient to get the case before the jury. "The court feels that the
strongest inference to be drawn for plaintiffs based on the epidemio-
logical evidence is that Bendectin could possibly have caused plain-
tiffs' injuries, therefore summary judgment is proper against
them."6
The Daubert trial court's confusion with respect to admissibility,
sufficiency, and the Federal Rules of Evidence, and how these relate,
illustrates the need for careful separation of issues in analyzing ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. The court grappled with evaluating
Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENvm. L REv. 441, 443 (1983).
64. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d at 945 (citing K J.
ROTIuN, MODERN EPIDMIOLOGY 116 (1986)).
65. A medical researcher begins by putting forward the hypothesis that there is no
association between Bendectin and an increase in limb reduction defects. Control
group studies then test this so-called null hypothesis. If birth defects occur with
higher frequency in a group of mothers whose only difference from the control group
is Bendectin use, the null hypothesis is rejected and the conclusion can be drawn that
there is evidence of some association between the drug and increased birth defects.
See id.
Such evidence does not directly "prove" Bendectin creates a higher risk of birth
defects, but when the sampling error of the research is small enough that the ob-
served increase is unlikely to have been the result of chance, the research can support
an inference of causation. Sampling error is measured by statistical analysis known as
"significance testing." See id. at 946-47 (citing RoTUMLN, supra note 64). For a gen-
eral discussion of significance testing, see DAViD W. BARNEs & JOHN M. CorNIXY, STA-
TISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LrTGATON chs. 3, 4 (1986).
66. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991).
67. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D.
Cal. 1989). See supra note 59 on confusion in the Daubert lower court opinions.
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the trustworthiness of plaintiffs' evidence, with its evidentiary "reli-
ability," but never succeeded in clarifying its standard of decision.
In its search for an admissibility standard to which to hold plain-
tiffs' evidence, the Daubert trial court tangled the requirements of
Rules 702 and 70368 and compounded the confusion with phrases
drawn from the "general acceptance" common law standard for ad-
missibility and from Rule 403's prohibition of misleading
testimony.6 9
B. The Daubert Court of Appeals Decision
The Daubert plaintiffs, unsuccessful in federal district court, ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Ninth Circuit,
however, excluded all of the plaintiffs' evidence, making any review
of the weight of the evidence academic.7 0 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in its brief Daubert opinion explicitly looked to the Frye
test to exclude the plaintiff's offered testimony. The court declared
that expert scientific testimony is admissible only if it is generally
accepted among the scientific community.7 1 Declaring it inappropri-
ate to allow this threshold issue of the evidentiary reliability of sci-
entific evidence to be left to each trial judge's discretion, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed de novo the plaintiffs' offered evidence for admissi-
68. The Bendectin cases are not the only cases in which reliability of scientific
testimony (Rule 702) is confused with an expert's reasonable reliance on underlying
data in a specific field of expertise (Rule 703). Another instance of such confusion can
be seen in the decision of the consolidated cases that became known as In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afl'd on other
grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Lombardi et al. v. Dow
Chemical, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988). See Michael C. McCarthy, "Helpful" or "Reasonably
Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert Witness's Methodology under Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 350, 363 (1992).
69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. at 572. The court
tries to explain the basis for its decision in a series of confused steps that appear to
the Author of this Comment to be distillable as follows. The court says that FED. R.
Evw. 703 restricts the admissibility of expert scientific testimony (although Rule
703's reference to reliance applies to underlying decisional data that need not be ad-
mitted by virtue of being a type relied upon in the expert's field, for example, where a
doctor's opinion is based on non-admitted blood tests). The court goes on to say, "A
necessary predicate to the admission of scientific evidence is that the principle upon
which it is based 'must be sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the
field to which it belongs.'" Id. (citing United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th
Cir. 1978)). The court concludes by mixing these two requirements into an amalgam
that does not follow: expert opinion not based on facts or data "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field" is not helpful, but instead is confusing
or misleading and should therefore be excluded. See FED. R. EvID. 403. Unfortunately,
the court's analysis treats Rule 703 as a general rule of exclusion rather than as an
opportunity for admitting expert opinion testimony without also having to admit un-
derlying decisional data.
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d at 1131.
71. Id. at 1129 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014)).
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bility.7 2 Seeking to articulate the standard of general acceptance, the
court relied on Bendectin case decisions from three other circuit
courts73 that had found for Merrell Dow when plaintiffs could pro-
duce no published and peer-reviewed epidemiological studies of
their own as evidence. "Lynch, Richardson, and Brock," the Ninth
Circuit said, "reflect a well-founded skepticism of the scientific value
of the reanalysis methodology employed by plaintiffs' ex-
perts. . . ."74 Ruling that re-analysis of epidemiological studies is
generally accepted by the scientific community only when it is sub-
jected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field, that is, only
when it is published for peer review, the Ninth Circuit followed her
three sister circuits and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment
in Merrell Dow's favor:
[W]e agree with the district court that the available animal and
chemical studies, together with plaintiffs' expert reanalysis of epi-
demiological studies, provide insufficient foundation to allow ad-
mission of expert testimony to the effect that Bendectin caused
plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, plaintiffs could not satisfy their
burden of proving causation at trial.71
In following this view, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow
a strong contrary opinion by the Third Circuit in the 1990 Bendec-
tin case of DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.70 By the
time it came to decide DeLuca, the Third Circuit already had re-
jected the Frye rule of general acceptability as the threshold test for
admissibility of scientific evidence.7 The Ninth Circuit, which still
held to Frye, relied on this difference to distinguish the DeLuca
analysis from its own in Daubert.8 The Third Circuit's evidentiary
analysis in DeLuca ultimately would reappear, to be ratified, in the
United States Supreme Court's 1993 decision on plaintiffs' appeal
from the Ninth Circuit's judgment in Daubert u. Merrell Dow.70
72. Id. at 1131.
73. Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
74. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d at 1131.
75. Id. The language of the Daubert trial court, by comparison, seems to indicate
the court was willing to admit re-analysis evidence but found it insufficient to allow
the matter to go to the jury. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727
F. Supp. at 576.
76. 911 F.2d 941, 942 (3d Cir. 1990).
77. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Paoli
Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, sub noa.
General Electric Co. v. Knight, 111 S. CL 1584 (1991).
78. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d at 1130-31.
79. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. CL 2786 (1993).
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C. The U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Daubert
The Supreme Court granted certiorari80 in the Daubert case be-
cause of the "sharp division" in the courts of appeal on the standard
for admission of scientific evidence.8' Basing its decision on the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals sum-
mary judgment for Merrell Dow and remanded the case for review
of the evidence without the "general acceptance" requirement of
Frye.82
When the dust finally settled in the Bendectin saga on scientific
evidence admissibility, the Supreme Court had used Daubert both
to transform the Frye rule and to interpret the requirements of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 702. No longer is "general acceptance" a stan-
dard for excluding scientific testimony. 3 Daubert relegates general
acceptance to use only as one of several possible arguments for ad-
mitting scientific evidence, and then only to the extent, that gen-
eral acceptance can demonstrate scientific validity and therefore evi-
dentiary reliability." However, evidence will not get a free ride into
court simply by virtue of being offered as scientific. Daubert inter-
prets Rule 702 as requiring judicial screening of the evidentiary reli-
ability of scientific evidence before it can be admitted. 8
Daubert was a battle on two fronts: (1) whether the Frye rule,
requiring general acceptance for admissibility of scientific evidence,
should be retained as an exclusionary mechanism, and (2) whether
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires any level of judicial screening
at all before scientific expert evidence can be admitted. In Daubert
the United States Supreme Court ultimately gave relief to the plain-
tiffs by displacing the Frye rule. At the same time, the court re-
sponded to the defendant's concerns by requiring some judicial
screening of scientific evidence for evidentiary reliability under Rule
80. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
81. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
82. Id. at 2799.
83. Id. at 2794. ("That austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the
Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.") (footnote
omitted).
84. For discussion of the role of "general acceptance" in admitting scientific evi-
dence, see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
85. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2797. ("Finally,
'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the inquiry. A 'reliability assessment
does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scien-
tific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community."' (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1238)).
The lack of widespread acceptance of a scientific claim can be raised by opponents of
such evidence not as a per se ground for exclusion but to trigger skepticism in the
court and therefore a closer scrutiny of the proponent's showing of the claim's scien-
tific validity. See id. at 2797.
86. Id. at 2797-98.
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702.7 Fifteen years earlier, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sit-
ting as the Law Court, had announced the same result under Maine
law in State v. Williams.88
IV. DAUBERT COMPARED TO STATE V. WILLIAfS
A. State v. Williams
In 1976 Maine's Kennebec County Superior Court found Thomas
Williams guilty of the criminal offense of terrorizing.," The jury
found that Mr. Williams was the caller who had telephoned the dis-
patcher at the Augusta Police Department to announce that a bomb
was going to go off at the Augusta airport. At Williams's trial, the
prosecution submitted a magnetic tape recording of the bomb threat
as well as another tape of the defendant reading out loud. The pros-
ecution proposed to call expert witnesses from Michigan State Uni-
versity and the Michigan Department of State Police to use speech
spectrograph technology to match the recorded voices and identify
the voice on the bomb threat tape as that of the defendant. The
defendant produced two witnesses, an expert from City College of
New York and a consultant to the Stanford Research Institute, to
oppose this evidence. They testified at preliminary admissibility
proceedings that use of speech spectrograph voice identification was
unreliable in forensic situations and that such evidence was not ad-
missible because the scientific community had not "generally ac-
cepted the speech spectrograph as a scientifically reliable method of
voice identification."90
Over the defendant's objections, the presiding judge allowed the
State's experts to present their speech spectrograph voice identifica-
tion testimony at trial. Both experts identified the voice of the
threatening telephone caller as the defendant's. Williams appealed
his subsequent conviction to the Law Court, on the ground that it
was error to admit in evidence the speech spectrograph testimony.
The Law Court affirmed his conviction.91
B. Williams and Daubert Present Parallel Issues
Justice Wernick, writing for the Law Court majority in 1978, de-
fined the first issue in Williams: "The threshold question we con-
front is to determine what standard, under the law of evidence, gov-
erns admissibility in relation to the type of evidence here
involved." 92 Fifteen years later, in opening the United States Su-
87. For discussion of reliability as the standard for admitting scientific evidence,
see Section V of this Comment.
88. 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 501, 505.
92. Id. at 501.
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preme Court's Daubert decision, Justice Blackmun's words paral-
leled Justice Wernick's: "In this case we are called upon to deter-
mine the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a
federal trial."9 3 In both Williams and Daubert analysis quickly fo-
cused on the general acceptance test set out in Frye.
The defendant in Williams had argued that speech spectrograph
voice identification was a new application of scientific principles and
therefore its admissibility as evidence should be governed by the
special standard set forth in Frye v. United States.4 Frye required
that there be general acceptance of such newly discovered or applied
scientific principle before the testimony could be admitted. The Law
Court refused to adopt the defendant's position, believing it would
be at odds with the fundamental philosophy of the Maine Rules of
Evidence.95 In Maine, Frye and its general acceptance rule would
not be allowed to constrain the rules of evidence. A scientific claim,
if established as valid, need not be generally accepted in order to be
reliable enough for admission in evidence in Maine.
The Supreme Court faced in Daubert the same question the Law
Court faced in Williams: What role should "general acceptance"
play in admitting scientific evidence? The Dauberts' primary attack
was on the continuing authority of the Frye rule. They argued that
the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Said
Justice Blackmun for the Court, "We agree."96 The United States
Supreme Court thus removed from federal admissibility decisions
the use of Frye as a tool of exclusion. Federal courts, like Maine
courts, would decide the admissibility of scientific evidence without
allowing Frye's general acceptance requirement to block expert
testimony.
In both Maine and federal courts, however, general acceptance
continues to serve a limited purpose in admission of scientific and
technological evidence. In Williams, Justice Wernick quoted McCor-
mick on Evidence: "'General scientific acceptance' is a proper con-
dition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a crite-
rion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.'9 7 The Law Court in
93. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
94. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 502.
95. Id. at 503. The court stated that the Maine Rules of Evidence favor "the ad-
missibility of expert testimony whenever it is relevant and can be of assistance to the
trier of fact."
96. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
97. The Law Court adopts Professor McCormick's language distinguishing scien-
tific "facts" from other scientific evidence. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 503 (citing
MCCORMICK, supra note 35, § 203 at 491). However, it is clear from a full reading of
Williams that the Law Court treats scientific "facts" as distinguishable from any
other scientific evidence only in the level of evidentiary reliability assigned by the
court. McCormick's scientific "fact" is merely a conclusion drawn from scientific
methodology in whose validity the court has complete confidence.
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Williams established that, under Maine Rule of Evidence 702, scien-
tific validity confers evidentiary reliability and admissibility. After
Williams, "general acceptance" cannot confer admissibility on a sci-
entific claim. "General acceptance" may be invoked in argument
only as a shorthand description for extended rigorous testing that an
hypothesis has withstood unscathed. However, the contention of
"general acceptance by the scientific community" as a shorthand
substitute for documented validation is vulnerable to challenge to
produce such documentation.05 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun as
well assigned to general acceptance a shorthand role in admitting,
but not in excluding, scientific evidence. "Widespread acceptance
can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible
"99
C. The Standard of Admissibility for Scientific Evidence Is a
Creature of The Rules of Evidence
Having assigned "general acceptance" only a limited role to work
on behalf of admissibility of evidence, the Law Court in Williams
went on to describe the Rules standard for admitting scientific evi-
dence. Evidence will not he-admitted simply because it is offered as
scientific. Admissibility will be appropriate only when the proffered
evidence passes through the several screenings of the Maine Rules of
Evidence.100 Proffered scientific evidence must roll through the
Rules like a ball bearing in a pinball machine, successively and suc-
cessfully passing one applicable gate after another, in order to be
admitted. There will be no shortcuts and no simplistic bright line
tests. Justice Wernick in Williams specifically addressed Rules 402,
403, and 702.
The Maine Rules of Evidence adopted in 1976 do not purport to
establish a special standard to govern the admissibility of testi-
mony involving newly ascertained, or applied, scientific principles.
Under the [Maine] Rules of Evidence all "relevant" evidence is
98. "General acceptance" per se has no relevance in admitting scientific evidence
except to the extent that the validation "general acceptance" purports to describe can
be documented. Opponents are free to demand that such documentation be pro-
duced. To avoid misunderstanding of the role of "general acceptance" in admissibility
arguments, if one means to say that a scientific claim is the result of a thorough and
documented validation process it is best to say so, without resort to the shorthand of
"general acceptance."
99. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. CL at 2797. The only
meaningful role left for lack of general acceptance in excluding scientific evidence is
in raising the court's skepticism as to the reliability of the claim. Id. See supra note
85.
100. The Maine Rules of Evidence "to a great degree parallel the Federal Rules of
Evidence .... ." FIELD & MuRRAy, supra note 8, at xiii. (In particular, Ma R. EvjD.





"except as limited by constitutional requirements or as
otherwise provided by statute or by . . .rules applicable
in the courts of this state." Rule 402, M.R. Evid.
In Rule 702, specific reference is made to the admissibility of scien-
tific testimony:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
As also potentially affecting a case of this nature, Rule 403 pro-
vides a general limitation on the admissibility of relevant evidence:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 101
While Maine rejects the general acceptance test of Frye, Maine
courts are not entirely without a screening mechanism for scientific
evidence. The screening mechanism for scientific evidence, the Law
Court said in Williams, is the Maine Rules of Evidence in the hands
of the presiding judge.
The controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testi-
mony, so long as the proffered expert is qualified and probative
value is not substantially outweighed by the factors mentioned in
Rule 403, are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Jus-
tice the testimony to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
...On the approach we adopt the presiding Justice will be al-
lowed a latitude, which the Frye rule denies, to hold admissible in
a particular case proffered evidence involving newly ascertained, or
applied, scientific principles which have not yet achieved general
acceptance in whatever might be thought to be the applicable sci-
entific community, if a showing has been made which satisfies the
Justice that the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable to be held
relevant.1 0 2
Fifteen years later, Justice Blackmun in Daubert echoed the
Maine Law Court's position in Williams. Daubert relegated "general
acceptance" to providing "shorthand" support for admissibility, but
101. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 503 (footnote omitted). "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." ME. R. EVID. 401.
102. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 504.
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the Unites States Supreme Court had no intention of indiscrimi-
nately flinging the gates open to all "scientific" evidence.
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not
mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial
judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary,
under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scien-
tific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable."' 3
The Supreme Court in Daubert, like the Law Court in Williams
before it, assigned to the trial judge the task of gatekeeper for scien-
tific evidence.10' The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit
judgment and remanded Daubert for decision under the Rules of
Evidence.105 The standard federal courts, like Maine courts, will use
in deciding the admissibility of scientific evidence will be
"reliability."
V. "RELmiLmrrY" AS THE STANDARD FOR DETERNHING
ADMssmmrrY OF ScmENmrIc EVIDENCE
"Reliability" is a term of art in scientific evidence admissibility.
Evidentiary reliability, or trustworthiness, is a function of the valid-
ity of the science involved. As the Supreme Court said in Daubert,
"In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability Vll
be based upon scientific validity."100 The source of the reliability
requirement is the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. The Source of the Reliability Requirement
The Supreme Court in Daubert identified the "primary locus" of
the obligation of reliability as Rule 702.107 In doing so the Court re-
lied on two admissibility requirements of Rule 702: that the expert's
testimony be of "scientific knowledge" and that it "assist" the trier
of fact.
First the Court addressed Rule 702's requirement of scientific
103. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. CL at 2794.
104. Id. at 2796 ("Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary a ssment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue.") (See FED. R. Evm. 104 and M_ R. Evm. 104, supra note 23).
105. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. CL at 2799.
106. Id. at 2795 n.9.
107. Id. at 2795 ("[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. The pri-
mary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of
regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.").
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knowledge as demanding evidentiary reliability. In order to be scien-
tific, evidence must be reliable. "In short, the requirement that an
expert's testimony pertain to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability."108 While Justice Blackmun did
not expand on this statement, the trial court's position must follow
from acceptance of the underlying implication: if a conclusion is sci-
entifically valid, then it is trustworthy'09 and reliable as evidence.
Once the implication of evidentiary reliability from scientific valid-
ity is accepted, a conclusion that necessarily must follow is that if
offered testimony cannot satisfy the court as being reliable, it cannot
have been scientific. The conclusion is the contrapositive of the un-
derlying implication and as such is of identical formal logical truth
value. Evidentiary reliability therefore becomes a threshold stan-
dard for qualification as scientific evidence. Evidence the court finds
unreliable cannot pass muster as having withstood scientific testing.
If it had withstood scientific testing, it would qualify as reliable.
Therefore, if the court finds evidence untrustworthy and not relia-
ble, it cannot begin to qualify as scientific knowledge and is there-
fore inadmissible.
Second, the Court saw reliability implicated in the Rule 702 re-
quirement that scientific evidence must assist the factfinder. The
link between assisting the factfinder and the reliability requirement
is relevance. The Court began by noting that "Rule 702's 'helpful-
ness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent
inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."" 0 That is, to assist the
jury, scientific evidence must be relevant."' In moving from rele-
vance to a requirement of reliability, the Court relied on an implicit
syllogism: unreliable evidence is irrelevant; irrelevant evidence does
not assist the jury; therefore unreliable evidence does not assist the
jury. Because scientific evidence is required by Rule 702 to assist the
jury, scientific evidence is required by Rule 702 to be reliable.
Justice Wernick in Williams also used relevance to tie reliability
to Rule 702's requirement that scientific evidence assist the jury.
"The controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testi-
mony.. . are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Jus-
tice the testimony to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.""11 2
108. Id.
109. The Supreme Court reiterated the definition of reliability. "[0]ur reference
here is to evidentiary reliability-that is, trustworthiness." Id. at 2795 n.9.
110. Id. at 2796.
111. Id. at 2795 ("Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony 'assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' This
condition goes primarily to relevance. 'Expert testimony which does not relate to any
issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.'" (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER 702[02], at 702-18)).
112. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d at 504.
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Under the rule the Law Court adopted in Williams, the presiding
judge will admit proffered scientific evidence if a showing has been
made that satisfies the judge that the evidence is sufficiently reliable
to be relevant. 113
This relevance link identified in both Daubert and Williams as
tying the admissibility of scientific evidence to its reliability impli-
cates several Rules of Evidence in addition to Rule 702. Unreliable
"scientific" evidence fails at the threshold to satisfy the relevance
requirement of Rules of Evidence 104(b),1 ' 401-402,115 and 403.110
In addition, even if evidence is based on valid scientific principles, it
still may be unreliable if it is inappropriately applied. Inappropri-
ately applied principles also fail to meet the relevance requirement
of Rules 401-403. Science that suffers from unreliable application to
data also may implicate Rule 703,117 even though its underlying ob-
servations and conclusions are valid.11 8
113. See id.
114. See supra note 23 for the text of FED. P, Evm. 104 and ME. R. Evw 104.
115. ME. R. Evm. 401 and Fan. R. EvD. 401 are identicah "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
MP. R. Evm. 402 and FED. R. Evw. 402 differ only in their state/federal references
to statutory limitations on relevant evidence. Under the Maine rule, "[A]U relevant
evidence is admissible, except as limited by constitutional requirements or as other-
wise provided by statute or by these rules or by other rules applicable in the courts of
this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." M&1. R. EvW. 402. Under
the federal rule, "[A]l relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. Evm. 402.
116. FED. F. Evm. 403 and ME. R EVID. 403 are identical- "Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by con-
siderations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
117. See supra note 39 for the text of FED. P Evw. 703, which is virtually identi-
cal to MF R. Evm. 703.
118. Testimony involving scientific theory that is venerable and reliable still may
fail Rule 703. Both ME. R. EvD. 703 and FED. R. Evm. 703 allow a qualified expert to
testify as to his opinion based on data that is not in evidence, and in fact may not
even be admissible in evidence, if that data is of a type reasonably relied on by ex-
perts forming opinions in that particular field. Reasonable reliance by a testifying
expert upon a particular kind of data is an issue separate from the requirement of
establishing the fundamental reliability of the underlying scientific methodology. The
question as to whether a doctor may testify under Rule 703 without introducing into
evidence all the test results, medical reports, and x-rays upon which he relied in mak-
ing a diagnosis can be seen as an inquiry into scientific application of an acceptably
reliable methodology. Once reliability of the underlying scientific methodology of di-
agnosis is established, it is also necessary, if an expert wishes to testify based on
inadmissible or non-admitted data, to establish that the data relied upon were of a
kind reasonably relied upon in applying such admissible methodology. The issue that
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In practice the distinction between viewing admissibility of scien-
tific evidence as an indirect function of reliability through the "will
assist the trier of fact" relevance requirement of Rule 702 or through
the direct relevance requirement of Rule 402 pales. Either way, the
admissibility of scientific evidence turns on relevance, and relevance
turns on the scientific validity and reliability of the proffered evi-
dence.1 " But how does a judge decide when "scientific" evidence is
reliable?
B. Evidentiary Reliability and Judicial Confidence
Reliability, as the term is used in admitting scientific evidence, is
a question of judicial confidence. The court must decide if the testi-
mony offered is sufficiently trustworthy to be allowed in evidence.120
Reliability acquires definition by the assigning or withholding of
confidence by the court.
The Supreme Court in Daubert made clear that assessment of the
reliability of scientific evidence means finding out if the "science" in
question is validly derived and validly applied. 2 1 Courts are not re-
quired to decide if the content and substance of the claim are "cor-
rect" or "true." The Court said:
The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity-and thus the
evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that under-
lie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on




arises when an expert opinion is based on a type of data not reasonably relied upon in
a field, thus requiring such data to be admitted into evidence under Rule 703, is to be
distinguished both from the issue of whether or not the underlying theory-as tested
upon earlier data observations-is reliable as well as from the issue of whether a reli-
able theory has been improperly applied. For a discussion of these issues see Chris-
tophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 1126 S. Ct. 1280 (1992) (affirming trial court's exclusion of phy-
sician's testimony that exposure to nickel and cadmium fumes had caused plaintiff's
cancer).
119. The second component of 'relevance' is 'probative value' or 'logical rele-
vance.' RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 153 (2d ed. 1982) (evidence is relevant if it 'tends logi-
cally to prove or disprove some fact in issue'). It is this component that
relates directly to scientific validity. If scientific information is not valid, it
does not increase or decrease the likelihood of any fact in issue.
Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party by A Group of American Law
Professors at 13, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993) (No. 92-102).
120. See supra note 28 for a discussion of evidentiary reliability, scientific valid-
ity, and trustworthy evidence.
121. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
122. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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In order to understand this term of art, "evidentiary reliability," in
the context of scientific evidence, it is helpful to look further into
the nature of science. Inquiry into the reliability of scientific evi-
dence addresses both the validity of the underlying reasoning and
methodology and the appropriateness of the methodology's applica-
tion to the facts.123 The first step in assessing evidentiary reliability
of a scientific claim is to inquire into whether its underlying hypoth-
esis is testable. Any hypothesis that cannot be subjected to the pos-
sibility of rejection by observation and experiment is not science.12'
That is, any hypothesis that cannot be tested empirically 12 is not
science. "Falsifiability" is the criterion of demarcation that distin-
guishes the empirical sciences from other forms of knowledge.12, A
claim that the sun rises because Mother Nature causes it to do so
cannot be tested and is not science.
Once a claim has been identified as being testable, the inquiry
into its evidentiary reliability next asks if in fact it has been tested.
A claim that is testable but never tested is not science.1 27 One that is
tested sufficiently to invoke confidence in its conclusions, although
never absolutely verifiable, is said to have been corroborated.1ss The
degree of corroboration of a scientific claim is not the number but
the rigor of the tests to which that claim has been subjected.2 0
One critical, rigorous test may be enough to move scientists to
have preliminary confidence in a particular conclusion, though they
123. See supra note 104.
124. See Ayala & Black, supra note 20, at 7.
125. "Empirical" is defined as "originating in or relying or based on factual infor-
mation, observation or direct sense experience usu. as opposed to theoretical knowl-
edge." WEBsTER's THIRD NEw ITEMRNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986).
126. See Ayala & Black, supra note 20, at 6 (citing PoPER, supra note 16).
127. POPPER, supra note 16, at 44-45 ("Now I hold that scientific theories are
never fully justifiable or verifiable, but they are nevertheless testable. . . .We do not
take even our own observations quite seriously, or accept them as scientific observa-
tions, until we have repeated and tested them."); id. at 47 ("[TJhere can be no ulti-
mate statements in science: there can be no statements in science which cannot be
tested, and therefore none which cannot in principle be refuted...
128. See Ayala & Black, supra note 20, at 30.
129. A hypothesis that has passed many empirical tests may be said to be
"corroborated." The degree of corroboration is not simply a matter of the
number of tests, but rather their severity. Severe tests are precisely those
very likely to have outcomes incompatible with the hypothesis if the hy-
pothesis is false. The more precise the predictions being tested, the more
severe the test. A so-called critical or crucial test is an experiment for which
competing hypotheses predict alternative, mutually exclusive outcomes. A
critical test thus will corroborate one hypothesis and falsify the others.
A single critical test will often suffice for scientists in a given discipline to
accept a hypothesis, at least for the purpose of advancing new hypotheses




will continue to test the new claim.130 The evidentiary reliability of a
scientific study is a function of the characteristics of the testing to
which that hypothesis has been subjected. 131
C. The Role of Court and Counsel in Establishing Evidentiary
Reliability
Justice Blackmun in the Daubert decision tries to help those
weighing the reliability of scientific evidence by listing four "general
observations" relevant to the inquiry.13 2 His list comprises not four
parallel reliability considerations, but the one fundamental consider-
ation, testing, followed by three different factors that may be used
singly or in combination to measure the rigor of the testing to which
a claim has been subjected. These three factors are publication/peer
review, statistical rate of study error, and general acceptance by the
scientific community of the pertinent discipline.133 The Court's ca-
veat that this listing is not definitive3 will be ignored at counsel's
peril. A testable claim that cannot establish any of Daubert's listed
factors for scientific validity nevertheless may be found to be of suf-
ficient scientific validity to be admissible as evidence. 1 5 The lack of
publication and peer review, the failure of a claim to have yet
achieved general consensus, the absence of statistical significance'3 0
calculations, or even the dearth of all three does not of itself estab-
lish that a claim has not been rigorously tested. What it does mean
is that a court will have to find other indicators of reliable method-
ology in order to admit the proffered evidence.' 37 Evidentiary relia-
130. See id.
131. For examination of the factors involved in valid scientific method, see, for
example, WEINSTIN & BERGER, supra note 111, 702[03] at 702-41 to 702-42; Black,
supra note 20 at 621; Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Ap-
proach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REv. 879, 911-12 (1982).
132. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2796 ("Many
factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive check-
list or test. But some general observations are appropriate.").
133. See id. at 2796-97.
134. Id. at 2796.
135. It is equally important to be aware that the existence per se of any of the
Daubert factors does not of itself guarantee the reliability of scientific evidence. Gen-
eral acceptance, for example, has been known on occasion to be a measure of political
force rather than scientific reliability. See Z. A. MEDVEDEV, THE RISE AND FALL OF
T.D. LYSENKO, (I. M. Lerner ed. 1969) (noting that Soviet "scientist" Lysenko's the-
ory that plant and animal traits are determined entirely by environment persisted for
decades on the strength of Joseph Stalin's protecting approval).
136. For sources discussing statistical significance see supra note 65.
137. See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987) (sum-
mary judgment affirmed on ground that plaintiff's expert had ignored a test result
that revealed high level of another chemical besides the pesticide in question in plain-
tiff's blood). The court said, "Without more than credentials and a subjective opin-
ion, an expert's testimony that 'it is so' is not admissible." Id. at 924. See also
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA "Fingerprinting" Can Teach the
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bility may be established by the logic, precision, thoroughness, and
internal consistency of a study's own test design and data collection
or on the strength of other corroborating testing of the scientific hy-
pothesis at issue.13
In summary, laying the foundation for reliability of scientific evi-
dence requires a showing that the claim proffered not only is testa-
ble but has been tested, in at least one study, by means that accord
with scientific methods.139 Under Rule 706, the court may appoint a
neutral expert to advise it about the reliability of scientific method-
ology.140 Otherwise the court will rely on preliminary showings in
evidentiary hearings to decide if a scientific claim offered in evi-
dence has been sufficiently tested to be considered admissible. This
is a matter of law, not a matter of scientific conclusions. The court
will decide how much reliability is enough.
It is up to the judge as evidentiary gatekeeper"4 to decide
whether the evidence offered is valid science, appropriately applied,
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CAmozo L REV. 361 (1991).
138. For a thoughtful treatment of reliability analysis focused on the question of
whether the claim was tested by recognized forms of scientific practice, see Brief of
the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Neither Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102).
139. See Black, supra note 20, at 642-43 & n.258. See also United States v. Do=n-
ing, 753 F.2d at 1224, 1238-39 (3d Cir. 1985); McCormick, supra note 131, at 911-12.
140. The relevant text of Federal Rule 706 is virtually identical to Ma. R. Evm.
706:
(a) Appointment.
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and
may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any
expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert wit-
nesses of its own selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the
court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so appointed shall be
informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which
shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties shall
have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the
parties of the witness' findings, if any;, the witness' deposition may be taken
by any party, and the witness may be called to testify by the court or any
party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by each party, in-
cluding a party calling the witness.
(c) Disclosure of appointment.
In the exercise of its discretion, the court may authorize disclosure to the
jury of the fact that the court appointed the expert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection.
Nothing in this rule limits the parties in calling witnesses of their own
selection.
FED. R. Evm. 706.
141. See Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Frye, 34
JuRii'Tmcs J. 133, 143 (1994).
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and therefore admissible. 142 It is up to counsel to argue convincingly
(1) that the testing methodology supporting an offered scientific the-
ory is valid and (2) that the theory is appropriately applied to the
facts at issue so as to support the decision the court must make of
evidentiary reliability.143 Daubert and Williams correctly require the
separation of conclusion from factors underlying the reliability of
that conclusion. Both decisions correctly require proponents and op-
ponents of scientific evidence to argue validity of process, not cor-
rectness of conclusion, in seeking to establish the court's confidence
in the reliability of that evidence.
The roles for counsel and court as advocate and evaluator of relia-
bility, respectively, follow from an understanding of the nature of
science. Williams did not before, and Daubert will not now, impose
any extraordinary new burden on either court or counsel.1 44 Nor do
142. See Lee Loevinger, On Logic and Sociology, 32 JURIMTUCS J. 527 (1992).
The reliability of scientific evidence also may be at issue at motions for summary
judgment. The court's confidence in the evidence is reflected in its assessment of
weight as well as admissibility. See supra notes 59 and 67 and accompanying text for
a discussion of reliability confused at admissibility and summary judgment. Whether
a scientific claim is challenged as insufficient evidence before, during, or after trial,
the court must decide essentially the same issue. The question of a "genuine issue" at
motion for summary judgment is very close to the issue at motion for judgment as a
matter of law. "In essence, . . . the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evi-
dence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
143. Arguing reliability is a role advocates play and courts accept readily in other
evidentiary contexts, for example in arguing and weighing the reliability of hearsay.
144. In the year since the Daubert decision was handed down, the circuit courts of
appeal have applied the rules-based admissibility standard for expert evidence in sev-
eral interesting cases. One of the first was United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769 (4th
Cir. 1993), which was pending on appeal when the Supreme Court decided Daubert.
Bynum had been found guilty of conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute. A critical component of the government's case at trial was the link be-
tween Bynum and his co-conspirators. The government called two chemists who testi-
fied that the impurities and by-products in the cocaine found on Bynum matched
those in cocaine found on the other conspirators. On appeal, Bynum argued that this
scientific evidence, based on a new federal/state gas chromatography analysis pro-
gram, should have been evaluated under the Frye rule. Id. at 773. The Fourth Circuit
held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in admitting the results of the
new technology. Defense counsel had offered no evidence to show that gas chromatog-
raphy is unreliable. The government not only had explained the basis of the underly-
ing science but also had listed the publication of peer-reviewed research results that
tested the scientific validity of chromatography analysis. Id.
In deciding Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993), the appellate
court let stand the trial court's decision under Daubert to admit a physician's testi-
mony for the plaintiffs on the connection between asbestos in the work environment
and employees' laryngeal cancer. The Sixth Circuit cited Daubert:
"This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or method-
ology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert v.
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Williams and Daubert leave juries vulnerable to "junk science." If
these precedents demand keener analysis of potentially tangled is-
sues of scientific evidence, so much the better. Arguments will be
clearer, and decisions will be stronger.
VI. INSIGHTS DRAWN FROM SELECTED SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
DEcsIoNs MADE BY THE MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
SINCE WILLIAAfS
In the years since the 1978 Williams decision did away with gen-
eral acceptance as an exclusionary rule and identified reliability
under Rule 702 as the basis for admissibility of scientific evidence,
the Law Court has functionally defined the reliability standard. The
Law Court has ruled on several scientific evidence questions, includ-
ing the reliability and admissibility of applied physics formulas,1a
clinical psychological studies,"" factors in witness credibility,4 7 and
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. at 2786. In assessing the reli-
ability of particular [scientific] evidence, the court may, but is not required
to, consider the degree of its acceptance in the scientific community.
Id. at 1014. Nothing in the rules of evidence or Daubert, said the court, precludes a
physician testifying from data gained in his own clinical experience as to the origin of
disease. The doctor's testimony could be admitted, and it was for the jury to consider
the weight to be given it in light of the testimony of the defendants' owm medical
expert Id.
The Second Circuit, hearing on appeal the convictions of John Gotti and Frank
Locascio stemming from their involvement with the Gambino crime family of La
Cosa Nostra, relied on Daubert, which focused on Rule 702, to emphasize the flexible
reach of Rule 703. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993). Defendants
argued on appeal that FBI expert testimony aimed at helping the jury understand the
structure of organized crime families was inadmissible because it was based on infor-
mation from "countless nameless informers and countless tapes not in evidence." Id.
at 937-38. They argued that under Rule 703, expert opinion testimony is admissible
only where the court finds explicitly that underlying inadmissible evidence is trust-
worthy. The Sixth Circuit rejected the defendants' argument.
The Locascio court ruled that, while Daubert indeed asserts there is no rigid stan-
dard for admitting scientific evidence, and a federal court therefore is not required to
admit testimony based on questionable data just because it is relied on by others in
the field, neither is the district court bound by an explicit trustworthiness require-
ment for underlying data. "The district court has broad discretion to decide the ad-
missibility of expert testimony based on inadmissible evidence." Id. at 938.
145. State v. Boutilier, 426 A.2d 876 (Me. 1981) (trooper's testimony excluded be-
cause formula for maximum engineered speed of roadway offered erroneously to
prove speed of defendant's car).
146. State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981) (expert testimony on battered wife
syndrome admitted to support claim of self defense); State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154
(Me. 1988) (clinical evidence explaining inconsistencies in testimony of sexually
abused children admitted, but clinical evidence on behavioral indicators of prior sex-
ual abuse in children excluded); State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984) (expert
testimony on "battered batterer" syndrome admitted, while expert testimony on be-
havior of abused children admissible for purpose of explaining behavior but not for
purpose of diagnosing prior abuse); State v. Lawrence, 541 A.2d 1291 (Mle. 1988) (ex-
pert testimony on behavior patterns symptomatic of sexually abused children ex-
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medical clinical studies.14 Taken as a whole, the Maine cases em-
phasize that admissibility of scientific evidence is a function not of
scientific category but of the court's confidence in research validity.
If federal decisions track the reliability standard as applied by the
Maine Law Court's decisions following Williams, the federal courts
will not open undiscriminating arms to proffered scientific evidence.
Certain of the Maine scientific evidence cases may give practitioners
some insight into Daubert's application.
A. State v. Lawrence: Temptation to Read What Is Not There
State v. Lawrence,' 9 decided ten years after Williams, illustrates
three issues that arise in preparing to argue the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence. First, it is important in analyzing scientific evidence
decisions to resist reading into the language of the court more than
is there. The Lawrence decision, for example, includes a sentence
that, although technically correct, may mislead the reader into be-
lieving that in Maine courts, even after Williams, lack of general
acceptance is still grounds for excluding scientific evidence. Justice
Nichols writes in Lawrence, citing State v. Philbrick: "A significant
factor in determining relevance and helpfulness is whether the sci-
entific matters involved in the testimony have been generally ac-
cepted or conform to a generally accepted scientific theory."'' 0 Phil-
cluded where no proof was offered of the scientific validity of the analytical tech-
niques involved in the clinical study); State v. York, 564 A.2d 389 (Me. 1989) (clinical
observations of behavior "generally accepted" as symptomatic of prior sexual abuse
in children excluded where the scientific validity of such conclusions was not
established).
147. State v. Fernald, 397 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979) (expert testimony offered on the
effect of stress on the reliability of eyewitness testimony excluded where the defense
failed to establish that the purported testimony was beyond "common knowledge");
State v. Gordius, 544 A.2d 309 (Me. 1988) (request that state provide for defendant
an expert to address interviewing techniques leading to inaccurate reporting by chil-
dren of sexual abuse denied where no research establishing the claim of inaccurate
reports resulting from particular interview techniques was offered in evidence); State
v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989) (clinical psychologist's testimony on ability of
child defendant to tell truth from falsehood excluded where the research basis offered
comprised 24 one-hour sessions with the child and "checking" with other psycholo-
gists, but see dissent in part by Justice Hornby concerning grounds for exclusion).
148. State v. LeBlanc, 559 A.2d 349 (Me. 1989) (medical clinical diagnosis of sys.
temic human yeast infection and physician's opinion of its consequences in behavior
of defendant admissible).
149. 541 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1988). In an opinion authored by Justice Nichols, testi-
mony on behavior patterns as symptomatic of prior sexual abuse to children was held
inadmissible. Although Justice Nichols had concurred in the judgment in Williams,
he refused to join in the majority opinion, declaring that the court should adhere to
the Frye standard of general acceptance. His was the only disagreeing voice in Wil-
liams. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 at 505-06.
150. State v. Lawrence, 541 A.2d 1291 at 1292 (citing State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d
844, 861 (Me. 1981)). In Philbrick, testimony by a detective with a three-week train-
ing course in blood spatters required the trial court to make a preliminary ruling on
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brick makes clear, however, that this is no withdrawal from
Williams and that the transformation of "general acceptance" from
an exclusionary standard to a shorthand151 ground for admitting
scientific evidence still holds. Citing Williams, the Law Court in
Philbrick noted:
One of the factors the presiding justice should consider in deter-
mining whether proffered testimony will be relevant and helpful to
the factfinder is whether the scientific matters involved in the tes-
timony have been generally accepted or conform to a generally ac-
cepted scientific theory. "General scientific acceptance" is not a
sine qua non of a proposed method of determining facts; however,
in order to be admissible the proffered expert testimony must be
demonstrated to have sufficient reliability to satisfy the eviden-
tiary requirements of relevance and helpfulness, and of avoidance
of prejudice to the defendant or confusion of the factfinder.'2
Second, in addition to illustrating the wariness required in read-
ing scientific evidence decisions, Lawrence also underscores that the
proponent of scientific evidence may pay a heavy price for failing to
lay the necessary foundation establishing that evidence's reliability.
Therapists' testimony aimed at establishing that children had been
sexually abused was improperly admitted at trial, the Law Court
held, because there was a complete absence of evidence on the scien-
tific reliability of the therapists' analytical techniques."" - In this case
the Law Court vacated a conviction even though the defendant her-
self had not preserved the error at trial, finding admission of the
therapists' testimony without proof of its evidentiary reliability to
be obvious error.2"
Finally, it should not be concluded that because a certain kind of
evidence was inadmissible in one case, it will be inadmissible there-
after. The error in Lawrence was not necessarily in the nature of the
scientific claim offered but in the failure to establish the validity of
the scientific methodology involved. 5 It is the necessary task of the
proponent to find evidence of valid scientific methodology where it
exists and to argue the tested validity of the underlying science and
hence its reliability as evidence.
the reliability of blood spatter science. The Law Court ruled that, pursuant to Ma R.
Evin. 702, the Philbrick trial court erred in failing to consider whether the detective
was testifying as an expert, and if so, whether he was qualified as such.
151. For a discussion of "general acceptance" as shorthand for scientific validity,
see supra note 98.
152. State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d at 861 (citations omitted).
153. State v. Lawrence, 541 A.2d at 1293.
154. Id. at 1292.
155. State v. Lawrence, 541 A.2d at 1293 ("There is a complete absence of evi-
dence on the scientific reliability of the therapists' analytical techniques in this
case."). By "scientific reliability" the court apparently meant evidentiary reliability,
as conferred by scientific validity.
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B. State v. Black: Separating Issues of Scientific Reliability
from Issues of Witness Credibility, and Excluding
Evidence Because of Validity Concerns
State v. Black 156 provides another source of insight into scientific
evidence admissibility without Frye. Black was decided by the Law
Court in 1988, ten years after the court rejected the Frye exclusion-
ary rule in Williams. Nevertheless, the defense in Black objected to
the testimony of a psychiatric nurse on the express ground that
there was no evidence of acceptance in the scientific community on
the particular claim at issue. 157 While the objection successfully
served to preserve the error for appeal, its raising of "no general
acceptance" as grounds for exclusion ignored both State v. Williams
and the fact that it is possible to establish reliability for a claim in
the face of "no acceptance" at all in the scientific community. Be-
yond that, it is even possible to establish evidentiary reliability for a
scientific claim when there has been prior active resistance to that
claim in the scientific community. 58 A single, soundly conceived and
carefully administered study may serve as a sufficient test to estab-
lish a claim as reliable evidence. Opponents of proffered scientific
testimony will find no comfort in the rejection of "general accept-
ance" as a rule of exclusion; proponents aware of the varied means
of establishing scientific reliability will.
Using scientific evidence to bolster or attack witness credibility
presents a double-layered evidentiary challenge. Black raises an im-
portant warning to counsel not to tangle analysis of the reliability of
scientific evidence with analysis of witness credibility.19 Two claims
156. State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154 (Me. 1988) (conviction of gross sexual miscon-
duct vacated because no demonstration of scientific reliability had been made for
testimony about "clinical features" of behavior serving as "indicators" of past abusive
trauma to a child).
157. Id. at 1156.
158. See State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981). In this case, the Law Court
held that the trial court erred in excluding expert psychological testimony on bat-
tered wife syndrome, which was offered to establish self defense in the killing of the
defendant's husband. This is a situation in which scientific study ultimately overcame
long resistance, first in the professional psychology community and ultimately in the
court, to accepting as possible self defense the killing of a batterer in circumstances
other than immediate physical threat.
159. Another Maine case instructive on the often tangled principles of reliability
of psychological evidence (governed by Rule 702) and the appropriateness of using
that evidence to bolster or to attack the credibility of witnesses (governed by Rules
404 and 608) is State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984). In Conlogue, the Law
Court admitted medical testimony of the "battered batterer" syndrome to bolster
defendant's argument that the mother of an abused child, herself battered as a child,
was the actual abuser, not he. Id. at 172. The dissent of Justice Scolnik and Chief
Justice McKusick provides valuable analysis of the principles of reliability of evi-
dence and credibility of witnesses. The dissenting justices would have excluded the
testimony not on the grounds that the reliability of the testimony was insufficient to
satisfy Rule 702 but because the use of the testimony violated Rule 404, which pro-
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of psychology were offered in Black; one was admitted in evidence,
one was not.160 The first claim was that persons who have suffered
from a particular type of trauma may not be able coherently or
chronologically to describe their experience. The second was that
victims of past sexual abuse can be identified on the basis of cur-
rently observed behavior.
Analysis of the admissibility of the psychiatric nurse's testimony
on the first claim, which offered a rationale for inconsistencies in the
victim's story, requires considering it both as scientific evidence
under Rule 702 and in terms of witness credibility under Rules 404
and 608. The victim's credibility had been attacked in cross exami-
nation under Rule 404(a)(2), which allows evidence of a witness's
character (including character for credibility) to be introduced; de-
fense counsel emphasized inconsistencies in the boy's testimony. In
rebuttal under Rule 608(a) the prosecution introduced the nurse's
testimony explaining the inconsistent nature of testimony that can
occur when a victim of a traumatic experience tries to describe what
happened. The Law Court ruled it was within the trial court's dis-
cretion to allow the prosecution to present its expert to try to ex-
plain those inconsistencies once the defense had extensively cross-
examined the boy about the timing and sequence of Black's alleged
abuse of him. 161 The Law Court did not mention the reliability of
the observations and methodology required to support the scientific
conclusion offered that trauma itself can be an explanation for an
incoherent recounting.
The Law Court in Black admitted without discussion of its scien-
tific reliability the nurse's testimony on psychological causes for wit-
ness inconsistency. It is impossible to know whether this was be-
cause the court considered the underlying methodology of the
assertion and found it sufficiently reliable or because the justices
simply were accustomed to working with such information and as-
sumed its reliability. Counsel cannot take such acceptance of a cate-
gory of scientific testimony for granted, however, and must be ready
to challenge or to establish if challenged, not only the scientific basis
for psychological testimony under Rule 702 but its proper applica-
tion in bolstering or attacking witness credibility under Rules 404
and 608.1"2
hibits evidence of a person's character from being admitted for the purpose of show-
ing that that person acted in conformity with such character on a particular occasion.
Id. at 173-74.
160. State v. Black, 537 A.2d at 1156.
161. Id.
162. See State v. Woodburn, 559 A.2d 343 (Me. 1989) (clinical psychologist's testi-
mony on whether or not a child alleged to be the victim of abuse could distinguish
truth from falsehood held not admissible because of insufficient scientific basis). The
decision, decided the year following Black, includes a strong dissent in part by Justice
Homby. The analysis of the Woodburn dissent is instructive in helping to separate
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The Law Court in Black was not so easily satisfied, however, that
the second psychological claim offered as proof derived from suffi-
ciently valid science. The psychiatric nurse testified that her clinical
observations of abused children led her to conclude that certain
identifying characteristics were displayed by children who at some
time in the past had been sexually abused. The Law Court found
this testimony inadequate to establish that the claim was scientifi-
cally valid and therefore reliable as evidence. The court explained:
The validity of the summary of symptoms encountered in the pop-
ulation of her patients is seriously impaired by selection bias. No
comparison testing was done with children who were not victims of
sexual abuse to determine whether they also demonstrated like in-
dicators. Her testimony demonstrates no scientific basis for deter-
mining that a causal relationship exists between sexual abuse and
the "clinical features of sexual abuse," nor is there demonstrated
even a positive correlation between the two.10 3
It would remain to be seen, of course, whether the Law Court
would have found psychological testimony reliable for identifying
characteristics of sexually abused children if evidence had been
presented that the nurse's clinical observations were carried out in a
different way. Although her conclusion might be exactly the same
after a differently structured clinical study, admissibility would turn
on the strength of that differently formulated inquiry. Predictions of
admissibility cannot be based single-mindedly on supposed patterns
of admissible "categories" of science. Conventional wisdom as to
which "kinds" of science will be admitted into evidence can be de-
feated by an upstart study, well planned, well performed, and well
documented, that casts aside past inadequacies of research into a
particular scientific claim."'
issues of evidentiary reliability from issues that would keep the offered evidence out
even if it were found to be reliable. The decision in Woodburn, like that of Black and
Conlogue, is a study in alternative exclusion standards: the unreliability of science
under Rule 702 as opposed to the inappropriate use of credibility evidence under
Rules 404 and 608.
163. State v. Black, 537 A.2d at 1157.
164. There are, of course, many scientific claims that have survived thorough and
severe testing and earned such confidence that their theories are appropriate subjects
of judicial notice, e.g., radar, x-ray technology, blood typing, bullet identification by
tool mark. However, previous admission of a scientific theory or claim may not neces-
sarily confer admissibility forever after. Lists of courts' reactions to scientific claims
based on underlying testing methodology and admissibility standards at the time of
the decision can be found in annotations. See, e.g., Debra T. Landis, Annotation,
When Will Expert Testimony "Assist Trier of Fact" So As To Be Admissible at
Federal Trial Under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 A.L.R. FED. 461
(1985); Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Reliability of Scientific Technique and Its Ac-
ceptance Within Scientific Community As Affecting Admissibility, at Federal Trial,
of Expert Testimony As To Result of Test or Study Based on Such Tech-
nique-Modern Cases, 105 A.L.R. FED. 299 (1991). Sound research methodology can
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C. State v. York: Claims within Certain Categories of Scientific
Evidence May Require Substantial Evidentiary Foundation
Comparison of the Law Court's majority opinion in State v.
York165 with the dissent raised by Justice Hornby and Chief Justice
McKusick illustrates the task faced by the court as it tries to estab-
lish where confidence should lie in treating scientific evidence. The
two dissenting justices would place more confidence than the major-
ity in the offered claim that current behavioral characteristics can
be used to identify past sexual abuse. Although the State had ar-
gued that use of clinically observed behavior was generally accepted
in the profession of psychology to identify victims of child abuse,
the court remained unconvinced of the scientific validity of the wit-
ness's offered conclusions. Behavioral symptoms of sexual abuse
might be reliable enough for use in psychological treatment. Still,
with only this much evidence offered of the scientific testing under-
lying the claim, the court ruled these conclusions of sexual abuse,
based on clinical observation of behavior, insufficiently reliable to be
admitted in evidence.16 6 General acceptance of a scientific claim
within a particular discipline is not necessarily a ticket to
admissibility. 67
The question of the validity of the science underlying the claimed
relationship between clinically observed behavior and abuse is a dif-
ficult one. Justice Hornby wrote in dissent in York, "I resist the sug-
gestion that clinical evidence is somehow inherently inadequate.
Trial courts routinely accept clinical testimony from medical physi-
cians concerning such matters as the onset and development of a
disease. I am not aware that all such testimony carries with it solid
empirical research beyond the clinical experience.'"1 For practition-
ers, Justice Hornby continued to raise a flag of warning; building a
case for the admission of certain scientific evidence, particularly
clinical psychology, may require especially thorough foundation
work.
What seems to be happening here is that, wittingly or not, appel-
late courts are in the process of carving out a separate and tougher
evidentiary rule for expert testimony in areas where they are skep-
tical of the science-clinical social work, perhaps the psychology
cut both ways. New and valid scientific evidence can cause earlier admitted conclu-
sions now to be considered unreliable just as it can cause scientific conclusions once
excluded now to be considered reliable evidence.
165. 564 A.2d 389 (Me. 1989) The York decision is complicated by the fact that
counsel did not object to the admission of the expert scientific testimony at trial; the
Law Court found the testimony inadmissible on appeal based on obvious error
analysis.
166. Id. at 390.
167. Id. ("Deveau testified that within her profession there are recognizable char-
acteristics of the sexually abused child .
168. Id. at 392.
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profession or even the social sciences generally.16 9
It behooves a proponent of such evidence to take care to establish as
fully as possible the validity of the scientific methodology on which
proffered clinical evidence is based.2
70
D. State v. Boutilier: Reliable Science Excludable When
Unreliably Applied
State v. Boutilier17 1 illustrates how reliable scientific theory can
be denied admission because it is unreliably applied. 7 2 Boutilier was
the driver of a car that missed a curve and crashed, injuring a pas-
senger who later died of his injuries. A state trooper testified at Bou-
tilier's trial as to the speed the car was travelling when it failed to
negotiate the curve, reconstructing the velocity of the car from tire
marks left on the pavement. His testimony was the only available
evidence of the car's speed. The Law Court declined to find the
trooper unqualified as an expert, though he had had only one year of
college and three weeks of accident investigation training. Such
qualifications as an expert left "a great deal to be desired,' 1 7 3 ac-
cording to the court, but the court would not take it upon itself to
overturn the decision as to expertise made at the trial court's
discretion.
17 4
What the Law Court would not accept, however, was the reliabil-
ity of the scientific speed analysis testimony the trooper presented.
He used a valid and well-tested formula, a sufficiently reliable scien-
tific theory, but the wrong theory for the facts. The voir dire dis-
closed that the trooper had arrived at his opinion of a precise range
of speed at which the defendant's car had been travelling by using a
formula developed to reveal the theoretical speed tolerance of a
curved roadway rather than the actual speed of a car that failed to
negotiate a curve.1
5
Admissibility of scientific evidence requires at a minimum: (1) a
169. Id. at 393.
170. Justice Hornby adds an important aside in the form of a footnote in York,
given that most scientific evidence appeals in Maine have arisen in criminal cases. "I
do not see," he says, "how we can distinguish criminal from civil trials; the relevant
evidentiary rules are unified. Although the burden of proof obviously differs, that
does not affect the threshold question of admissibility." Id. at 392 n.2.
171. 426 A.2d 876 (Me. 1981).
172. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
173. Id. at 878.
174. Id. ("It is evident to us from the voir dire in this case that Trooper Joseph's
training and experience leave a great deal to be desired. Yet, we would hesitate to
overturn the ruling of the presiding justice, which involves a large measure of discre-
tion, solely for that reason.") Qualification as an expert is a fundamental component
of the foundation required for admitting scientific evidence under both ME. R. EvID.
702 and FED. R. EvID. 702.
175. Id. at 878-79.
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qualified expert, (2) testifying to a theory whose reliability has been
established by sufficient scientific testing, (3) applied correctly to
the facts of the case. In this case the misapplication of a sound the-
ory resulted in the whole of the offered "scientific" evidence being
found unreliable and inadmissible. Boutilier's conviction for man-
slaughter was set aside.'
E. State v. LeBlanc: Minimal Reliability and Exclusion Under
Rule 403
State v. LeBlanc17 would be an intriguing case for the creativity
of the defense alone. However, it also serves to illustrate both the
functional minimum of validity that can support admissibility of sci-
entific evidence and the use of alternative grounds for excluding evi-
dence. In LeBlanc, the trial court had refused to admit medical tes-
timony purporting to establish that Mr. LeBlanc was subject to
"polysystemic candidiasis," an overgrowth of yeast organisms in the
systems and organs of the body whose microtoxins allegedly caused
LeBlanc to become confused and disoriented, in which state he en-
tered a woman's bedroom and assaulted her.1 7 8 The defense claimed
that such confusion established that the defendant did not have the
capacity to form the requisite criminal intent. Among the State's
arguments on appeal was the apparently imperishable objection
(eleven years had passed since State v. Williams had declared lack
of "general acceptance" no longer the standard for exclusion of sci-
entific evidence) that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence was
proper because the candidiasis theory lacked general scientific
acceptance. "
Justice Roberts, writing for the Law Court, disposed gently once
more of the "lack of general acceptance" exclusion argument Wil-
liams had rejected. The Law Court would adhere to its determina-
tion in State v. Williams that general scientific acceptance is not a
prerequisite for the admission of scientific testimony.1 80 Further-
more, the Law Court found, this novel medical theory, offered by a
general surgeon, had "some" relevance.1 81
The scientific claim of the effects of candidiasis was sufficiently
valid to pass the minimal reliability test of Rule 702 for admission
in evidence. That was not to say the court would admit it, however.
Reliability sufficient for relevancy, sufficient for assisting the
factfinder, is not necessarily reliability sufficient to confer probative
value that can outweigh the danger of delay and confusion to the
176. Id. at 880.
177. 559 A.2d 349 (Me. 1989).






satisfaction of Rule 403.182
The doctor, in his offer of proof, stated that the yeast microtoxins
with which he had diagnosed LeBlanc had an effect on individuals
that was somewhat unpredictable. He added that their effect when
combined with alcohol was not really predictable.18 3 The Law Court
accepted as scientifically valid the doctor's work in arriving at his
diagnostic theory, but at the same time the Law Court affirmed the
trial court's exclusion of this doctor's testimony. In finding the
weight of the evidence insufficient, the court said, "We conclude,
therefore, that [the doctor's] diagnosis of polysystemic candidiasis,
even if accepted as reliable, had minimal probative value in advanc-
ing LeBlanc's defense. We find no reversible error in the court's con-
clusion that the obvious danger of delay and confusion [of issues]
outweighed that minimal probative value."184
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1993 United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow, which parallels the 1978 Maine Law Court decision in
State v. Williams, will wreak no generalized havoc in admissibility
of scientific evidence in federal courts. As in Maine courts since Wil-
liams, the Frye standard of "general acceptance in the scientific
community" is no longer available as an exclusionary tool, although
it lingers as a potential shorthand means for arguing the validity
and admissibility of scientific evidence. Admissibility of scientific
evidence in federal courts will turn now on the reliability of that
evidence, with reliability a function of the validity of research un-
derlying the scientific conclusions offered. The locus of this reliabil-
ity requirement in both Maine and federal courts is Rule of Evi-
dence 702.
Issues of scientific evidence admissibility lend themselves to con-
fusion. The several evidence rules'85 in addition to Rule 702 that can
be called upon to exclude scientific evidence are not always clearly
explicated in court decisions. The temptation to find relief from de-
cisions of uncertain analysis in a mantra that classifies "types" of
science as admissible or inadmissible exposes counsel to the risk of
facing unarmed an informed opposing argument grounded in the
doctrine of evidentiary reliability. Maine case law since Williams,
read with an eye to the scientific validity, relevance, and probative
182. See supra note 116.
183. State v. LeBlanc, 559 A.2d at 352.
184. Id. (citation omitted).
185. Scientific evidence can be excluded as irrelevant (Rule 402), because the facts
to which a proffered theory applies are not of a category typically relied upon (Rule
703); because use of scientific evidence has been used inappropriately to attack or
bolster witness credibility (Rules 404 and 608); or because the scientific evidence's
probative value is insufficient to outweigh the unfair prejudice it induces (Rule 403).
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issues underlying the reliability standard, can provide guidance for
arguing admissibility of scientific evidence in both Maine and post-
Daubert federal courts.
Like the Law Court in Williams before it, the Supreme Court in
Daubert correctly comprehended the fundamental nature of science
and requires those who hope to introduce evidence they would clas-
sify as science to understand as well. The need to make evidentiary
admissibility decisions for expert scientific testimony does not re-
quire that every judge become a scientist. Courts must bring to
questions of scientific evidence admissibility a general understand-
ing of scientific methodologies, those common processes of mind and
technique by which hypotheses in all the disciplines of science are
tested. Counsel must provide a similar understanding of scientific
methodology to substantiate argument that such scientific testing
has, or has not, been used to arrive at the claim proffered. Counsel
must also be prepared to argue that the proferred scientific evidence
is or is not properly applied to the case at hand. Abbreviated at-
tempts to categorize claims as admissible by category will fail before
the understanding that there is no hierarchy of "good" or "bad" sci-
ence but only conclusions reached either by the methods of science
or not.
Leigh Stephens McCarthy
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